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[L. A. No. 18805. In Bank. May 1, 1944.]

ORA BAUGH, Respondent, v. FRANCIS L. ROGERS et aI.,
Appellants.
[la, lb] Workmen's Compensation-Persons Entitled-Persons
Cleaning House or Office.-Where a woman employed to do
housekeeping at premises used by a physician as an office and
as a residence was struck by an automobile driven by the
physician while she, at the direction of the physician's wife,
was closing the office window from the outside, the evidence
established' as a matter of law that the employer-employee
relationship existed between the cleaning woman and the
physician and that they were subject to the provisions of
' the Workmen's Compensation Law in relation to her injury,
it appearing that she was at all times subject to the right of
control by her employer as to the duration of her employment
and as to what she did and how she did it.
[2] Independent Contractors-Actions-Questions of Law and
Fact.-Where the evidence is susceptible of only a single inference and a single conclusion, it is a question of law
whether one is an employee or an independent contractor.
[3] ld.-Existence of Relationship-Exerdse of Control as Factor.-In determining whether the status of an independent
contractor or that of an employee exists, a material and generally conclusive factor is the right of the employer to exercise complete and authoritative control' of the maloner in which
the work is done. The existence of such right of control and
not the extent of its exercise constitutes the relationship that
of employer-employee.

,

II:
:Ij

"~

[4] Workmen's Compensation-Remedy Under Act as Exclusive.
-Where conditions of compensation existed for injuries sustained by an employee when she was struck by an automobile driven by her employer, and where the employer had
secured the payment of compensation by proper insurance,
[1] See 27 Cal.Jur. 275, 325.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, ~ 41(1);
[2] Independent Contractors, § 34; [3] Independent Contractors,
§ 4; [4, 9] Workmen's Compensation, § 11; [5, 10, 13J Automobiles, § 167(1); [6, 8J Automobiles, § 167(3); [7J Automobiles,
§ 167(2); [l1J Workmen's Compensation, §§ 2, 4; [12J Workmen's Compensation, § 29; [14J Bailments, § 2; [15, 16J Bailments, § 11; [17-19] Automobiles, § 167a; [20] Automobiles, U75.
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jurisdiction to hear a claim for compensation was exclusively in the Industrial Accident Commission, and the superior court had no authority to render a judgment for the
employee in a personal injury action against the employer.
(See Lab. Code, §§ 3601, 3706, 5300.)
[5] Automobiles-Perlons Liable-Lender or Bailor.-The fact
that the negligent operator of an automobile is liable to an
injured employee for workmen's compensation only, does not
preclude recovery by the employee from the owner for the
negligence imputed by Veh. Code, § 402.
[6] ld.-Persons Liable-Lender or Bailor-Nature of Liability.
-The owner of an automobile involved in an accident is
directly 'liable for the damages suffered, although he cannot
avail himself of all the rights given him by Veh. Code, § 402,
subds. (c) and (d), as where no recourse can be had against
the property of the negligent operator because" he has a special defense to an action brought against him by the injured
person, and where the plaintiff in such action has no right
of actio? to which the owner may be subrogated.
[7] ld.-Persons Liable-Lender or Bailor-Construction of Statute.-The asserted rule of strict construction does not authorize the court, by narrow and strained interPretation of Veh.
Code, § 402, to thwart the palpable intent of the Legislature to
impose a new liability consonant with new conditions, and the
court is not required to deny recovery in a case which, both by
the wording of the statute and in accordance with the purpose
of its enactment, is within its tenor.
[8] ld.-Persons Liable-Lender or Bailor-Nature of Liability.
-While the liability created by Veh. Code, § 402, is somewhat
analogous to that of a master for the acts of his servant under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, inappropriate incidents
of that doctrine cannot be attributed to the statutory relationship, and the analogy does not control the interpretation of
the statute.
[9] Workmen's Compensation-Remedy Under Act as Exclusive.
-While under the Labor Code the employer's sole liability
for the employee's injury is workmen's compensation and the
exclusive remedy therefor is an application to the Industrial
Accident Commission, the character of the act itself is not
damnum absque injuria or otherwise inherently nonactionable. While the fact of negligence as a proximate cause of
the injury is made immaterial, a remedy for the injury is provided which may be enforced in the forum created.
[6] See 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 478; 5 Am.Jur. 697.
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[10J Automobiles - Persons Liable - Lender or Bailor. _ Onder
Veh. Code, § 402, it is the negligence of the operator, and
not his liability or status, which is imputed to the Owner of
the vehicle. The negligence being imputed, the liability is lii~
Own, and the owner cannot avail himself of theoperatur's
special defense under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
[l1J Workmen's Compensation-Compensation Laws-Purpose._
The Labor Code does not purport to alter the correlativp
rights and liabilities of persons who do not occupy tht' ft'.
ciprocal statuses of employer and employee. The worklJlf'n"
compensation laws were not designed to relieve One ot be',
than the employer from any liability imposed by statutt' or'
by common law.
[12J Id.-Actions Against Third Persons-Defenses._The em.
ployee's right to reCOver against a third person is not affected
by the fact that the "person other than the employer" is not
a stranger, but has entered into a consensual legal relation_
ship with the employer.
[13a-13c.l-Automobiles_Persons Liable-Borrower or Bailee.In an action for injuries sustained by an employee when her
employer negligently backed another person's automobile into
the employee, the provisions of the Labor Code governing tht'
reciprocal rights and liabilities between plaintiff and defen.
dant operator as employee and employer do not abrogate tht'
independent and correlative rights and obligations between
the owner and the operator as bailor and bailee; and the negligent operator, even though he has an available defense in
such action as against the plaintiff, may eventually be liablt' ,
to defendant owner under the law of bailments.
[14J Bailments-Transactions Constituting._ When the owner of
an automobile gives another person possession of it with
permission to operate it, a contract of bailment is created.
[15J Id.-Bailor's Liability for Bailee's Negligence.-At common
law a bailor is not liable to third persons for damages resulting from the bailee's negligent Use of the bailed property.
[16J Id.-Bailee's Liability for Negligent Injury to Bailed PropertY.-A bailee is responsible in damages to the bailor for any
injury to the bailed property resulting from a failure of the
bailee to exercise a proper degree of care in protecting it.
[17J Automobiles-Persons Liable-Lender or Bllilor._ Veh. Code,
§ 40~, subd. (a), has operated to modify the Illw of bllillllt'nts
[15J See 6 Am.Jur. :l96.
(16J See 6 Am.Jur. ;)79.
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in California; insofar as the bailment of motor vehicles is
concerned, in that it places on the bailor responsibility for
the bailee's negligence in operation of the bailed property.

[18] Id.-Persons Liable-Borrower or Bailee.-The right of the
owner of a vehicle to recover from the negligent operator, a.s
created by Veh. Code, § 402, subd. (d), becomes .an element
of every contract of bailment of a motor vehicle in this state.
[19] Id.-Persons Liable-Borrower or Bailee-Nature of Liability.-The fact that an employer who negligently backed another person's automobile into an employee may be· held liflhlt'
as a bailee for negligently using the bailed property does not
tend to impose double liability on such operator; i. e., liability to his employee for workmen's compensation and to the
owner for the amount of the judgment arising out of the sallie
injury, as the owner will be entitled to have credited on the
judgment against him any amount paid by the operator (or
his insurance carrier) by way .Jf compensation for the inJury.
and the amount to be recovered by the bailor-owner frOTII tht'
bailee-operator necessarily will be reduced pro tunto.
[20] Id.-Actions-Parties.-In an action against the owner of
an automobile for injuries arising out of its negligent operation by plaintiff's employer when he was driving it with the
owner's permission, the negligent opera to)' is 8 proper (and
on the facts of the case a necessary) party defendant under
Veh. Code, § 402, subd. (c), and the operator, even though
he· is subject to the conditions of compensation and has a
complete defense to the action, is a person int.erested therein
because the amount of any ,judgment recovered may determine the amount of a potentiEilly impending recovery by the
owner-bailor against the bailee-operator.

ApPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granting a new trial. Percy Hight, Judge pro
tern. Affirmed.
Nourse & Jones, Paul Nourse and Everett W.
for Appellants.

Thompso~

Russell H. Pray, Robert E. Krause and Samuel J. Nordorf
for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-This ca.se presents four fundamenta.l problems, two of which, so far as the research of counsel and ourselves discloses, have not heretofore been considered by a
court of last resort either in this state or elsewhere. The
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problems may be more conveniently defined after a statement
of the essential facts.

Essential Facts and Legal Relationship of the Parties
The plaintiff was employed in a dual capacity by the defendant Rogers, who was a physician and surgeon and who,
in addition to living quarters, maintained certain rooms in
lLis residence as an office for the practice of his profession.
Plaintiff was engaged by the wife of defendant Rogers to work
Itt the residence by the hour one day a week. She did cleaning and other household duties in such parts of the premises
as Mrs. Rogers from time to time directed. While she was
working in the living quarters she was "engaged in household domestic service" and was not an employee as that term
is defined in sections 3352 (g) and 3358.5 of the Labor Code,
but when her services were devoted to the maintenance of
the "business premises" she came within the statutory definition of "employee." (See Lab. Code, §§ 3351 and 3355.)
On July 22, 1941, at a time when plaintiff was cleaning the
office quarters of her employer, she was directed by Mrs.
Rogers to go "outside to push and jam the [office] window
[which was open] in, while she [Mrs. Rogers] was holding
and pulling on it on the inside." While plaintiff was occupied in performing this task she was struck and injured by
an automobile negligently operated by her employer, the
defendant Dr. Rogers. The automobile was owned by the
defendant Warnock and was being driven with his consent.
Dr. Rogers carried compensation insurance as required by
section 3700 of the Labor Code.
At the trial, which was without a, jury, the court found all
essential basic facts in favor of the plaintiff and also found,
in support of defendants' pleaded "second affirmative defense, " that "at the time and place of the accident . . .
plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant Francis L. Rogers
and that the accident . . . occurred while the plaintiff was
acting in the scope and course of her employment"; that
plaintiff and defendant Rogers were subject to the compensation provisions of the Labor Code; that defendant Rogers
carried compensation insurance; and (obviously a conclllsion
of law) that "this court has no jurisdiction of the cause of
action ... and the plaintiff has no capacity to sue." Judgment for the defendants was entered but plaintiff's motion
for a new trial was granted as to both defendants on the
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ground, among others, that the evidence was not sufficicnt
to support the decision. This appeal is by the defendants
from the order granting a new trial.
Statement of Questions Involved
The following legal questions are presented: 1. Does the
evidence establish as a matter of law that the employee-employer relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant
Rogers and that they are subject to the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Law (Lab. Code) in relation to
plaintiff's injury? 2. If they are subject to such compensation law, is that fact a defense to this action insofar as defendant Rogers is concerned T 3. If recovery cannot be had
in this action by plaintiff against defendant Rogers, the negligent operator, may she· nevertheless recover from the owner
of the automobile, defendant Warnock, by virtue of the provisions of section 402 of the Vehicle Code Y 4. (a) If plaintiff recovers judgment herein against the owner Warnock, is
such owner necessarily precluded from any recourse against
the negligent operator by reason of the latter's relation to
the plaintiff? (b) Is the negligent operator a necessary or
proper party defendant in this action Y
The last two questions (3 and 4), so far as we are advised,
have not heretofore been passed on by any court of last resort. We have concluded that: 1. The evidence establishes
as a matter of law that plaintiff and defendant Rogers, at
the time of the accident, were in the relation of employeeemployer and are subject to the compensation provisions of
the Labor Code. 2. Such relation is a defense to this action
insofar as defendant Rogers is concerned. 3. Plaintiff may,
nevertheless, recover from the defendant ,owner. 4. (a) The
negligent operator, even though he has an available defense.
herein as against plaintiff, may eventually be liable to the
defendant owner under the law of bailments, and (b) such
operator is a proper and, upon the facts of this case, a necessary, party defendant.
Discussion of the Law
[la] 1. Upon the Evidence, as a Matter of Law, Plaintiff
Was an Employee. The conclusion we have reached relative
to the first question of law above stated needs little discussion. Plaintiff contends that from the evidence the trial court
might have found that she was ~ independent contractor,
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and, hence, that the order must be affirmed. (See Newman
v. Overland Pac. Ry. Co. (1901), 132 Cal. 73, 74 [64 P. 110] ;
'Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterprises (1942), 49 Cal.App.~d 383,
392 [121 P .2d 829].) [2] But" If from all the facts only
a single inference and one conclusion may be drawn, whether
one be an employee or an independent contractor is a question of law." (Yucaipa Farmers etc. Assn. v. Industrial Acc.
Com. (1942); 55 Cal.App.2d 234, 238 [130 P.2d 146]; see,
also, Burlingham v. Gray (1943),22 Cal.2d 87, 100 [137 P.2d
9J.) Here the controlling facts are undisputed. [Ib] l<"rom
the plaintiff's own testimony, and without substantial conflict
by inference or otherwise, it appears that plaintIff wall at all
times subject to the right of control by her employer as to
the duration of her employment and as to what she did and
,how she did it. The employer did not maintain constant
supervision over plaintiff but that fact is immaterial. On her
part, the plaintiff could have quit working for Dr. Rogers at
any time she saw fit so to do.
An independent contractor is one "who renders services
for a specified recompense for a specified result,under the
control of his principal as to the result of his work only and
not as to the means by which such result is accomplished."
(Lab. Code, § 3353.) [3] The distinction between the statm
of independent contractor and that of employee has often
been considered by this court, and it is well established that
a material and generally conclusive factor is the right of the
employer to exercise complete and authoritative control of
the manner in which the work is done. The existence of such
right of control and not the extent of its exercise constitutes
the relationship that of employer-employee. (S. A. Gerrard
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1941), 17 Ca1.2d 411, 413, 414
[110 P.2d 377] ; Burlingham v. Gray (1943), supra, 22 Cal.
2d 87, 95, 99 [137 P.2d 9] ; Riskin v. Industrial Acc. Com.
(1943), 23 Cal.2d 248, 253 [144 P.2d 16].) "Perhaps no
single circumstance is more conclusive to show the relationship of an employee than the right of the employer to end
the service whenever he sees fit to do so." (Press Pub. Co.
v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1922), 190 Cal. 114, 120 [210 P.
820]; Hillen v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1926), 199 Cal. 577,
582 [250 P. 570] ; Chapman v. Edwards (1933), 133 CaI.App.
72, 77 [24 P.2d 211].) "An employee may quit, but an independent contractor is legally obligated to complete his con.
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tract." (Los Flores S. Dist. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1936),
13 Cal.App.2d 180, 183 [56 P.2d 581].)
Viewing, the evidence here in any, light admits of no reasonable conclusion save that plaintiff was an employee and
that all the conditions of compensation prescribed in the Labor
Code existed.
[4] 2. The fact that All the Conditions of Compensation
Existed, Is a Defense Avat'lable to the Employer in this Action by his Employee. Section 3600 of the Labor Code de.
clares that "Liability for the compensation provided by this
division [Div. 4] in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to
any person except as provided in section 3706. shall, without
regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury
sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course
of the employment ... in those cases where" the conditions
of compensation, as itemized, exist. Section 3601 provides
that "Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right
to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
this division is, except as provided in section 3706, the exclusive remedy against the employer for the injury or death."
Section 3706 creates the exception that "If any employer
fails to secure the payment of compensation, any injured employee or his dependents may proceed against such employer
by filing an application for compensation with the commission [Industrial Accident Commission] and, in. addition, may
bring an action at law against such employer for damages,
as if this division did not apply."
The above quoted language is plain. The conditions of
compensation existed and the employer (Dr. Rogers) had secured the payment of compensation by proper insurance.
Jurisdiction to hear the claim for compensation is exclusively
in the Industrial Accident Commission. (Cal. Const., art. XX,
§ 21; Lab. Code, §§ 5300, 5301.) The trial court, therefore,
had no authority to render judgment for the recovery by
plaintiff (the employee) of damages from the defendant
Rogers (the employer). This, however, as will later appear,
does not mean that defendant Rogers is not a proper or
necessary party defendant.
!' [5]
3. The Fact that the Negligent Operator of the Automobile Is Liable to Plaintiff for Workmen's Compensation
.Only, Does Not Prr,clude Recovery by Plaintiff from the
Owner for the Negligence Imputed by Section 402 of the Ve-
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hide 0 ode. By subdivision (a) of section 402 of the Vehicle
Code it is provided that "Every owner of a motor vehicle
is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to person
or property resulting from negligence in the operation of
such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the
permission, express or implied, of such owner, and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner for all
purposes of civil damages." Subdivision (b) of the same section limits the liability of the owner "to the amount of five
thousand dollars ... for the death of or injury to one person
in anyone accident. " Subdivision (c) requires that" the operator of said vehicle whose negligence is imputed to the owner
shall be made a party defendant if personal service of process
can be had upon said operator within this State. Upon recovery
of judgment, recourse shall first be had against the property of
said operator so served." Subdivision (d) declares that "In
the event a recovery is had under the provisions of this section against an owner on account of imputed negligence, such
owner is subrogated to all the rights of the person injured
or whose property has been injured and may recover from
such operator the total amount of any judgment and costs
recovered against such owner." From what has already been
said it appears that recourse cannot "first [or at all] be had
against the property of said operator" because he has a special defense to this action; also it appears that the provision
that "such owner is subrogated to all the rights of the person injured" is meaningless here because plaintiff has no
right of action in the premises to which the owner may be
subrogated.
[6] Defendants argue, in effect, that subdivisions (c) and
(d) create conditions upon subdivision (a) and, hence, that
the liability otherwise imposed by subdivision (a) does not
attach unless all of the rights given the owner by subdivisions
(c) and (d) are available. But this contention cannot be sustained. It has long since been determined that the purpose
of the Legislature in enacting section 402 of the Vehicle Code,
and its predecessor, section 171414 of th(~ Civil Code, was to
change the common law rule ofbailments (for common law
rule see 8 C.J.S. 318, § 40) and to impose upon the bailorowner a liability for the imputed negligence of the operator,
to whom he has entrusted the possession and control of his
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vehicle, which, as between the owner and the injured person,
is direct and unconditional within the limits set.
The case of Broome v. Kern Valley Packing 00. (1935),
6 Cal.App.2d 256 [44 P.2d 430], involved a cause of action
arising under section 1714% of the Civil Code. The provisions now found in subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 402
were then in the form of provisos, which might thus more
readily than the present subsections have been interpreted to
limit the availability of the cause of action against the owner
to a situation where the owner could protect himself against
loss by the means given him in the provisos. The statute,
however, was not so interpreted.
Speaking through Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard, the court
said (at p. 261 of 6 Cal.App.2d) : "It would seem that the
main purpose of this section is to make such an owner directly responsible to a person injured through the negligence
of an operator driving the car with the owner's permission,
although the section also contains provisions calculated to protect the owner from the results of the operator's negligence
in so far as this may be done between those parties without
interfering with the rights of the injured party...•
"[P. 262] While this section is not as clear as could be
desired, we think it imposes a primary and direct liability
upon such an owner, with secondary provisions to enable
him to protect himself as against the operator of the car."
Not only was a petition for hearing of the above quoted from
case denied by this court but the reasoning and quoted language were expressly approved in Holland v. Kodimer
(1938),11 Ca1.2d 40, 43 [77 P.2d 843], wherein it was said
that "In our opinion, the decision in Broome v. Kern Valley
Packing 00 . . . . accurately analyzes and applies section
1714% ... "
It is. settled that the liability of the owner is not affected
by the fact that he cannot avail himself of the provision of
subdivision (c) of section 402 that "recourse shall first be
had against the property of said operator," either because,
although the operator was served and appeared, there was no
final adjudication of his liability (Holland v. Kodimer, supra; Broome v. Kern Valley Packing 00. (1935), supra, 6 Cal.
App.2d 256 [44 P.2d 430] ; see, also, Sanderson v. Niemann
(1941), 17 Ca1.2d 563, 572 [110 P.2d 1025]) or because the
operator had disappeared (Sutton v. Tanger (1931), 115 Cal,
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App. 267,270 [1 P.2d 521]) or died (Sayles v. Peters (1936).
11 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [54 P.2d 94]; Lee v. Deasy
(1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 667 [66 P.2d 175] ; National Automo.
bile Insurance 00. v. Ounningham (1940), 41 Cal.App.2d
828, 831 [107 P.2d 643]).
In the last cited case, the court said (at p. 831 of 41 ('Hi
App.2d): "While the cause of action against th(' driv('T' Ill'
the car abates on his death, such death does not bar tht' ('<)
of action against the owner whose liability is primary
As the liability of the owner to the injured plaintiff rl:'lIlil"
even though the plaintiff's caUSe of action against the lll:'gil
gent operator "dies with the death of the wrong-doer." :-;(J
it remains even though the plaintiff is deprived of his caw.;p
of action for civil damages against the negligent operator
because the accident Occurred under the conditions of work.
men's compensation.

/1

[7] In further Support of their contention that negli.
gence can be imputed under section 402 only where such
negligence is actionable against the operator and the owner
can avail himself of the protection of subdivisions (c) and
(d) of that section, defendants contend that "Since the im.
puted negligence statute created a new right of action, giving'
a remedy against a party who would not otherwise be liable.
it must be strictly construed." (Weber v. Pinyan (1937).
9 Ca1.2d 226, 229 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407, 409J.) In
addition to the Weber case, defendants cite Swing v. Lingo
(1933),129 Cal.App. 518, 526 [19 P.2d 56], and Oook v. Superior Oourt (1936), 12 Cal.App.2d 608, 610-611 [55 P.2d
1227] . From a consideration of these cases and of others
construing the statute, it appears that in sustaining the action
against the automobile owner in the present situation we do
no violence to the so-called rule of strict construction. We
are not called upon here to determine whether that rule can
properly be applied to any liability created by our codes. In
each of the cases cited by defendants there was an unsuccess_
ful attempt to stretch the statute to cover a situation readily
found, by reference to the language of the statute itself (or,
in the Weber case, by reference to the language of the Legislature in a statute covering a kindred subject), to be beyond
its purport. The instant case, however, appears to be within
the contemplation of the statute as construed in Broome v.
Kern Valley Packing 00. (1935), supra, 6 Cal.App.2d 256,
and Holland v. Kodimer (1938), supra, 11 Ca1.2d 40.
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Certainly the asserted rule of strict construction does not
authorize us to thwart, by narrow and strained interpretation, the palpable intent of the Legisl'ature to impose a new
liability consonant with new conditions; we are not required
to deny recovery in a case which, both by the wording of the
statute and in accordance with the purpose of its enactment
as declared in the opinions interpreting it, is within its tenor.
We cannot, in any preoccupation with the common la~ rule
of strict construction, overlook the rule of construction imposed by section 4 of the Civil Code that the provisions of
the code "are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
its objects and to promote justice." If there were any question as to the applicability of a similar rule of construction
to a provision of the Vehicle Code it would be set at rest
insofar as section 402 is concerned, since that section had its
origin in the Civil, Code, and section 2 of the Vehicle Code
provides that "The provisions of this code, insofar as they
are substantially the same as existing provisions relating to
the same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements
and continuations thereof and not as new enactments." Thus
the rule of construction applied in the Broome case, supra,
to effect the objects of section 1714% of the Civil Code followed the section, as it were, when in slightly different form
it became section 402 of the Vehicle Code.
[8] Defendants further argue in support of their contentbn that only when negligence of the operator is actionable
against him is it imputable to the owner under section 402,
that the liability created by that section is analogous to that
of a master for the acts of his servant under the doctrine of
respondeat sttperior and "just as the liability of the master
is dependent upon the liability of the servant so is the liability of the owner dependent upon the liability of his bailee. "
However, from the limited analogy pointed out by the courts
of this state (Sutton v. Tanger (1931), supra, 115 Cal.App.
267, 269; Swing v. Lingo (1933), supra, 129 Cal.App. 518,
522, 526), it does not follow that inappropriate incidents of
the doctrine of respondeat superior can be attributed to the
statutory relationship. The analogy has never been considered controlling in the construction of the imputed negligence statute.
Whether the liability of a master under the doctrine of
respondeat superior depends, as stated by defendants, "upon
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the liability of the servant" or only Upon the servant's culpability, is a question on which there is a lack of harmony
among the jurisdictions which have considered the point. In
California one aspect of the question was presented in the
case of Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation District (1938), 26
Cal.App.2d 385 [79 P.2d 419], cited by defendants. That
case held that an unemancipated minor could not recover
damages against the employer of his father for injuries caused
by the negligence of the father acting within the scope of
his authority and in the course of business. The court reasoned that the child could not recover from the father in a
tort action (p. 388), that the employer would be able to recoup from the father the amount of damages recovered by
the child (p. 389), and that "What the child cannot do directly he should not be permitted to accomplish by indirection" (p. 390). The conclusion there reached by the court
was predicated on the philosophy that "The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
the best interest of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress
for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent"
(quoted in Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation District (1938),
supra, from 20 R.C.L. 361), and that" Any proceeding tending to bring discord into the family and disorganize its government may well be regarded as contrary to the common
law, and not to be sanctioned by the courts" (quoted in the
Myers case from Matarese v. Matarese (1925), 47 R.I. 131,
133, 131 A. 198, 199, 42 A.L.R. 1360, 1361). No such basis
exists here for limiting the liability imposed by section 402
of the Vehicle Code. Indeed, that philosphy has no application to section 402. If we were to apply it and were to
follow the reasoning of defendants, we should have to hold
that such section was inoperative when a child by consent
drives his parent's automobile (or when a parent by consent
drives that of his child) because to give effect to the section
would set up a basis for conflicting claims between parent
and child. It is, of course, common knowledge that the section finds frequent application in parent and child cases. A
recent case where it was so applied is Souza v. Oorti (1943),
22 Ca1.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861]
[9] In contending that defendant Rogers' negligence is
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nonactionable it is apparent that defendants use the term
"nonactionable" only in the limited sense that recovery for
such negligence from the defendant Rogers by court action
is barred by the Labor Code, in that by its provisions the
employer's sole liability for the employee's injury is workmen's compensation and the exclusive remedy therefor is an
application to the Industrial Accident Commission. Obviously the character of the act itself is not damnum absque
injuria or otherwise inherently nonactionable. Actually,
while the fact of negligence as a proximate cause of the injury is made immaterial, a remedy for the injttry is provided
which may be enforced in the forum created. [10] The
special defense of the negligent operator, based on the business relationship and status of the operator and the plaintiff,
and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law, is
not available to the owner. It is the negligence of the operator, and not his liability or status, which is imputed to the
owner. The negligence being imputed, the liability therefor
is his own.
In Schwartz v. Forty-Second St. M. & St. N. A. Ry. 00.
(1940), 175 Misc. 49 [22 N.Y.S.2d 752], a similar problem
was presented as to application of section 59 of the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides in part that" Every
owner of a motor vehicle ... operated upon a public highway
shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person
or property resulting from negligence in the operation of
such motor vehicle ... , in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the same with
the permission, express or implied, of such owner." (Laws
N.Y. 1929, vol. 1, ch. 54, p. 82.) The trial court there proceeded on the theory that, because by virtue of the New York
Workmen's Compcnsation Law the employee cannot maintain
an action against his co-employee (the negligent operator),
"it logically follows that he cannot maintain one against
another person [the owner of the vehicle] whose sole liability
derives from the negligence of a co-employee." (P. 754 of
22 N.Y.S.2d.) This is the only case dealing directly with the
question which has corne to our attention. It docs not appear to llave been presented to a higher court.. As indicated
above, such an approach in the present case would ignore the
meaning and purpose of our iIllputed negligence statute.

-----------------------------------------------------------.----.-.
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Hence, and for the other reasons given, we are impelled to a
contrary conclusion.
[11] It is to be observed also that thc Labor Code does
not purport to alter the correlative rights and liabilities of
persons who do not occupy the reciprocal statuses of employer and employee. Our workmen's compensation laws
were not designed to relieve one other than the employer
from any liability imposed by statute or by common law.
"The claim of an employee for compensation does not affect
his claim or right of action for all damages proximately resUlting from such injury or death against any person other
than the employer." (Lab. Code, § 3852; see, also, Stackpole v. Pacific Gas If Elec. Co. (1919), 181 Cal. 700, 703 [186
P. 304]; Van Zandt v. Sweet (1922), 56 Cal.App. 164, 165
[204 P. 860] ; Driscoll v. California St. Cable R. Co. (1926),
80 Cal.App. 208, 214 [250 P. 1062].) [12] The employee's
right to recover against a third person is not affected by the
fact that the "person other than the employer" is not a
stranger but has entered into a consensual legal relationship
with the employer. (Wallace v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.
(1930), 105 Cal.App. 664, 668 [288 P. 834] ; Merino v. Pacific Coast Borax Co. (1932), 124 Cal.App. 336, 338, 341
[12 P.2d 458].) In eacb of the above cited cases the liability of the third person was based upon his own common law
negligence, whereas the liability Jere sought to be imposed
upon the owner Warnock is statutory, based upon the impu,
tation to him of the operator's negligence. However, we find
nothing in the present case which must impliedly exclude
plaintiff's right of action against Warnock from the operation
of the quoted section (Lab. Code, § 3852), and we are satisfied that the action may proceed to judgment as against him.
[13a] 4. (a) The Provisions of the Labor Code Governing the Reciprocal Rights and Liabilities between the Plaintiff and the Defendant Operator as Employee and Employer
Do Not Abrogate the Independent and Correlative Rights and
Obligations between the Owner and the Operator as Bailor
and Bailee. [14] When the owner of an automobile gives
possession of it, with permission to operate it, to another
person, a contract of bailment is created. [15] At common law a bailor is not liable to third persons for damages
resulting from the bailee's negligent use of the bailed property (6 Am.Jur. 396, § 313) and hence we find no decisions
as to the right of the bailor to recover from the bailee the

amount of any judgment to which the bailor may have been
subjected by reason of the bailee's negligent use of the bailed
property. [16] However, it is elementary in the law of
bailments that a bailee is responsible in damages to the bailor
for any injury to the bailed property resulting from a failure of the bailee to exercise a proper degree of care in protecting it. (See Milgate v. Wraith (1942), 19 Ca1.2d 297,
303 [121 P.2d 10] ; Brown v. Roland (1940), 40 Cal.App.2d
Supp. 825 [104 P.2d 138].) "Where the bailment is for the
sole benefit of the bailee, he is bound to exercise great care
or extraordinary diligence" (8 C.J .S. 280, § 29; see, also, Civ.
Code, § 1886) ; and "Where, through negligence of the bailee,
bailed property in his hands is injured ... the bailor is entitled to recover such a sum as will reasonably compensate
him for the injury sustained . . . " (6 Am.Jur. 379, § 294;
see, also, Civ. Code, § 1889.) [13b] If Dr. Rogers, in negligently backing Warnock's car into the plaintiff, had injured the vehicle we have no doubt but that under the above
stated principles of the law of bailments he would be liable
to Warnock for the damage to the bailed property. The fact
that it was with an employee of the bailee that the damagecausing collision occurred would be wholly immaterial. This
principle, we are satisfied, is equally applicable to the case
before us insofar as concerns the independent and correlative rights and obligations of the owner and of the operator
as between them.
[17] As hereinabove suggested, section 402(a) of the Vehicle Code has operated to modify the law of bailments in
this state, insofar as the bailment of motor vehicles is concerned, in that it places upon the bailor responsibility for the
bailee's negligence in operation of the bailed property_
[18] In the nature of reciprocity for the liability thus created in subdivision (a), subdivision (d) provides, among
other things, that "In the event a recovery is had under the
provisions of this section against an owner on account of imputed negligence, such owner . . . may recover from such
operator the total amount of any judgment and costs recovered against such owner." The right of the owner to recover
from the negligent operator, thus created by subdivision
(d), becomes an element of every contract of bailment of a
motor vehicle in this state (see Brown v. Ferdon (1936),
I) Ca1.2d 226, 230 [54 P.2d 712] ; Hales v. Snowden (1937),
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19 Cal.App.2d 366, 369 [65 P.2d 847] ; Mueller v. Elba Oil
Co. (1942), 21 Ca1.2d 188, 204 [130 P.2d 961] ; Fernelius v.
Pierce (1943), 22 Ca1.2d 226, 243 [138 P.2d 12]) and is now
just as effectively a part of the law of bailments (of motor
vehicles) in California as is the obligation of the bailee to
respond in damages for injury to the bailed property occasioned by his negligence. [13c] There is nothing in the
Labor Code which abrogates this obligation imposed on the
bailee by the law of bailments. If the owner of a motor vehicle, without fault on his part, suffers a judgment based on
the imputed negligence of his bailee, he becomes entitled to
recover the amount of that judgment and costs from the negligent bailee. What may have been the relationship between
the plaintiff in the original action and the bailee is immaterial in an action between the bailor and the bailee. based
exclusively upon their independent, correlative rights and
obligations.

[19] It has been suggested that this holding may tend to
impose double liability upon the negligent operator; i. e.,
liability to his employee for workmen's compensation and to
the owner for the amount of the judgment against him arising out of the same injury. But the contention is not sound.
The owner will be entitled to have credited on the judgment
against him any amount paid by the operator (or his insurance carrier) by way of compensation for the injury, and the
amount to be recovered by the bailor-owner from the baileeoperator necessarily will be reduced pro tanto.
[20] 4. (b) The Negligent Operator is a Proper (and on
the Facts Hej-e a Necessary) Party Defendant Even though
He Has a Complete Defense to this Action. Subdivision (c)
of section 402 of the Vehicle Code requires that "In any action against an owner on account of imputed negligence as
imposed by this section the operator of said vehicle whose
negligence is imputed to the owner shall be made a party
defendant if personal service of process can be had upon said
operator within this State" and there follows the further
provision that "Upon recovery of judgment, recourse shall
first be had against the property of said operator so served."
In this case, although as previously mentioned recourse cannot "first [or at all] be had against the property of said
operator" because no recovery can be had against him, he
must nevertheless be named M a party defendant and served
with process if such service can be had within this state. The
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statute expressly so requires and the operator, even though
he be the employer of plaintiff and subject to the conditions
of compensation, is a person interested in the action against
the owner because the amount of the judgment, if any, against
the owner may well determine, in part at least, the amount of
a potentially impending recovery by the owner-bailor against
the bailee-operator.
It may be that upon the new trial defendant Rogers, upon
his separate application, will be entitled to have this action.
dismissed as to him, but upon the record before us it appears
that the order granting a new trial must be affirmed as to
both defendants. Both defendants appear jointly, by a single
answer, and the judgment entered was "that the plaintiff
. . . take nothing by this action and that the action be dismissed and that the defendants Francis L. Rogers and A. W.
Warnock have judgment against the plaintiff for their costs
in the sum of $33.25." As this is a joint judgment and it
does not appear that the defendant Rogers severally is necessarily entitled to exactly that judgment, we cannot hold that
the order granting a new trial as to him is improper.
'rhe order appealed from is affirmed as to both defendants.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
TRA YNOR, J., Dissenting.-The majority opinion recognizes that the plaintiff cannot recover damages from her employer, since section 3601 of the Labor Code makes her right
to recover workmen's compensation the exclusive remedy
against her employer. In effect, however, it allows recovery
of damages against the employer by holding that the owner
of the vehicle can shift the damages for which he is liable under
section 402 of the Vehicle Code to the employer because of the
bailor-bailee relationship between him and the employer. The
employer's liability for damages in such a case is thus determined by the chance circumstance that he did not own the
car that he negligently operated. Had he owned it, he would
not be liable for damages directly or indirectly. Because he
does not own it, he is made liable for damages, indirectly
but none the less actually. It is my opinion that recovery
in the one case as in the other would violate the policy and
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
The California Constitution (art. XX, § 21) provides that
all matters essential to a complete system of workmen's com-
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pensation are the public policy of the state, binding upon all
departments of the state government. Pursuant to this provision, the Legislature has ena~ted a complete system of rightl!
and obligations for the compensation of workmen for injuries
incident to their employment. This system supersedes the
statutory and common law that formerly governed the liability of employers for injuries to their employees, and covers "the entire field of injury to workmen in the course of
their employment." (Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 415 [156 P. 491, Ann.Cas. 1917E 390];
Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 692 [151
P. 398] ; Alaska Packers' Association v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
200 Cal. 579, 583 [253 P. 926].) When conditions specified
in the compensation law arise, the remedy therein provided
excludes all other statutory or common law remedies against
the employer for all injuries to employees in the course of
their employment regardless of the manner in which they
occur. (De Carli v. Associated Oil Co., 57 Cal.App. 310, 311
[207 P. 282]; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Super~or Court,
62 Cal.App.2d 601 [145 P.2d 344] ; Freire v. Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal.2d 8, 10 [118 P.2d 809].)
Section 3601 of the Labor Code expressly denies to the
employee any remedy against the employer except the right
to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Law: "Where the conditions of
compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided in section 3706, the exclusive remedy against the em·
ployer for the injury or death. II. Although directed against
the owner of the car, the plaintiff's claim under section 402 of
the Vehicle Code is in practical effect a claim for damages
against her employer. Under the majority opinion, the employer, as the negligent operator of the car, and not the
owner, bears the ultimate burden of the employee's claim, '
since the owner can shift that burden to the employer. Such
indirect recovery of damages from the employer, who is responsible only for the payment of compensation as specified
·Section 3706 has no application, for appellant hlld secured the

payment of compensation by procuring insurance in aecordnnc6 with
Section 3700.
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in the Workmen's Compensation Law, is as contrary to the
public policy and provisions of that law as a direct claim for
damages against the employer.
, Section 3600 of the Labor Code expressly provides that
liability of the employer for the compensation provided by
the Workmen's Compensation Law shall be, except as provided in section 3706 "in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person." Immunity from liability to "any per·
son" clearly includes immunity from any liability to the
owner of the car on account of the inJury to the employee.
This section precludes liability other than that imposed by
the Workmen's Compensation Law to third persons for independent claims of such persons, as, for example, claims of such
persons for wrongful death of the employee. (Treat v. Los
A.ngeles Gas &; Elec. Corp., 82 Cal.App. 610, 616 [256 P.
447] ; McLain v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 56 Ca1.App. 60, 62
[204 P. 869] ; Gerini v. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co., 27 Cal. '
App.2d 52, 54 [80 P.2d 499].) It must therefore preclude
liability for an employee's claim for damages that has been
converted into a claim of the third person for reimbursement
for the satisfaction of the employee's claim for damages.
The mlljority opinion relies on section 3852 of the Labor
Code, which provides, "The claim of an employee for compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for all
damages proximately resulting from such injury or death
against any person other than the employer." It goes onto
allow the owner to have credited on the judgment against him
any amount paid by the employer or his insurance carrier.
The allowance of such a credit, however, is contrary to the
provisions in section 3852 and section 3856 that an employer
who pays or becomes obligated to pay compensation is subro~
gated up to the amount of his obligation to the employee'S
claim against the third person. (National A.utomobile Ins.
Co. v. Cunningham, 41 CaLApp.2d 828 [107 P.2d 643];
Morris v. Stamdard Oil Co., 200 Cal. 210 [252 P. 605].) If
the provision in section 3852 of the Labor Code relied upon.
in the majority opinion is applicable, the rest of that section
must likewise be applicable, with paradoxical results. A neg~
ligent employer, who cannot be sued in a common law action
for damages, is nevertheless held liable to the owner of the
~ar for damages less the amount of workmen's compensation
paid the employee, but the owner is in turn liable to his neg-
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tigent bailee for the amount of workmen's compensation that
the bailee was required tv pay for the injury resulting from
the negligent operation of the vehicle by the bailee. To hold
that section 3852 is operative to permit the bailee-employer
to recover against his bailor even though the only basis for
the bailor's liability is the negligence of the bailee, would
be a violation of the principle set forth in section 3517 of the
Civil Code that no one can take advantage of his own wrong.
The conclusion is inevitable that the operator-employer is
not liable for damages either directly or indirectly. The
question remains whether the owner can be held liable for
damages to the employee regardless of the nonliability of the
employer. It is my opinion that since the employer's liability is completely covered by the Workmen's Compensation
Law no liability on the part of the employer remains for
which a third person can be liable.
The majority opinion relies on cases holding that the own~r 's liability under section 402 of the Vehicle Code is in
form "a primary and direct liability," and concludes that
the owner's liability is not affected by the fact that the employee has no right of action against his employer becauSe
of the latter's negligence in driving the car. These cases
hold that lack of final adjudication of the liability of the
operator of the car (Holland v. Kodimer, 11 Cal.2d 40, 43
[77 P.2d 843]; Broome v. Kern Valley Packing Co., 6 Cal.
App.2d 256 [44 P.2d 430]) or disappearance of the operator
subsequent to the injury (Sutton v. Tanger, 115 Cal.App.
267 [1 P.2d 521]) or his death (Sayles v. Peters, 11 Cal.App.
2d 401 [54 P.2d 94] ; Lee v. Deasy, 19 Cal.App.2d 667 [66
P.2d 175] ; National Automobile Ins. Co. v. Ounningham, 41
Cal.App.2d 828 [107 P.2d 643]) does not affect the statutory
liability of the owner. It does not follow, however, that because the liability of the operator of the automobile need not
be determined by judgment before the plaintiff can recover
against the owner, the latter can be held liable for imputed
negligence of the operator despite specific provisions of the
Labor Code barring any recovery of damages from the employer-operator. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, 3601.) Again, the
abatement of an action against the operator of the car because of his death differs materially from the prohibition of
such an action by the Workmen's Compensation Law. The
abatement of the right of action by death succeeds the creation of the claim, and the claim for personal injury is lost
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because of its personal character. (Clark v. Goodwin, 170
Cal. 527, 531 [150 P. 357, L.R.A. 1916A 1142]; see 1 Cal.
Jur. 71.) Abatement because of the death of the wrongdoer
affects only the personal relationship, not the liabilities of
co-obligors that existed before the death of the wrongdoer.
The Workmen's Compensation Law denies recovery of damages against the employer, not because of the personal character of the claim for personal injury, but to insure the effective operation of its own system. An action for damages
is not regarded as the appropriate remedy for the negligence
of the employer. The Workmen's Compensation Law, therefore, does not abate a claim that has been created but prevents it from ever arising.
Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 29,
1944. Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a
rehearing.
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Decedents' Estates - Claims - Actions-Instructions.-In an
action on a creditor's claim involving the fundamental issue
whether monies advanced by plaintiff to a person since deceased were loans or voluntary advances, an instruction that
if the jury believed that decedent received sums of money
from plaintiff no express promise to repay such loans was
necessary, and that the jury should find for plaintiff if they
further found that said monies had not been repaid to plaintiff, invaded the province of the jury by assuming the basic
fact that monies were advanced as loans.
Money Paid-Necessity for Request-Voluntary Payments.[2]
There can be no recovery for the voluntary payment of a debt

[1]

(2] See 17 Cal.Jur. 590; 4 Am. Jur. 506.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Decedents' Estates, § 547; [2] Money
Paid, § 4; [4] Money Received, § 19; (5] Trial, § 136; (6] Frauds,
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tates, § 491.

